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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the “stylized facts” of the current realities in the world of production and 
the world of work in Latin America and the Caribbean. It groups the key factors that can be 
considered as the main drivers of change and determinants of the future of work in the region. 
It suggests the need for a more integrated and renewed view of the nexus of productive 
development-technology-innovation-education-skills-employment and employability. And 
it argues the need for new, broader pacts that express this vision, along with institutional 
reforms that translate it into concrete, sustainable actions and State policies.  
 
Este artículo analiza los “hechos estilizados” de las realidades presentes del mundo de la 
producción y del trabajo en América Latina y el Caribe, y agrupa los principales factores 
que pueden verse como vectores de cambio y determinantes de futuro del trabajo en la 
región. Se sugiere la necesidad de una visión renovada y más integrada del nexo desarrollo 
productivo-tecnología-innovación-educación-competencias-empleo y empleabilidad. Y se 
argumenta que se requieren nuevos y amplios pactos que expresen esta visión y reformas 
institucionales que la traduzcan en acciones concretas y sostenibles como políticas de 
Estado. 
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2/2016, 3a época. Please cite using this reference 
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I. The determinants of the future of work  
 
In an effort to organize ideas about the complex reality of the world of work and the factors 
that influence it, one can identify five groups of factors that have a decisive influence on the 
present and future of work: (1) demographic and population factors; (2) technological factors; 
(3) the productive development (or underdevelopment) of countries; (4) new enterprise 
models and forms of contracting; and (5) the political views of social actors and social 
dialogue processes.  
 
1. Demographic and population factors  
 
Because of the law of large numbers and the stability of demographic structures demography 
is one of the most exact sciences, at least in the absence of catastrophes. Figure 1 shows the 
huge demographic transition in the region in the 150 years between 1950 and 2100. The trend 
toward an aging population is notable: in 1960, of a total population of 162 million, 3%, or 
some 5 million, were senior citizens (age 65 or over); in 2000, the total population had grown 
to 512 million, of whom 6%, some 30 million people, were senior citizens. In 2050, a total 
population of 776 million is expected, of which 20%, 155 million people, will be senior 
citizens. And in 2100, the percentage of senior citizens will be 30%, about 204 million 
people, of a total of 680 million inhabitants.  
 
Meanwhile, the young population (ages 15 to 29), has been decreasing since the late 1990s, 
a trend that has become more pronounced since 2010. Although this population still 
represents 29% of the total population, that proportion will decrease to 22% by 2050. In fact, 
2050 will be a milestone, as that will be the year in which the proportion of adults over age 
65 will begin to exceed the proportion of young people between ages 15 and 29 for the first 
time in the region's history.  
 
What does this mean for the world of work in Latin America and the Caribbean? Nothing 
less than revolutionary changes. The dizzying growth of the population of senior citizens will 
bring and this is already occurring in several countries—high growth in demand for 
occupations in the health and care economy, such as doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, 
hospital services and those related to "assisted living." Meanwhile, a majority of countries in 
the region are still experiencing the so-called "demographic dividend": the potential 
advantage of a large young population entering the work force. But this possible "injection" 
into growth and welfare is only possible if young people receive an education and there are 
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low rates of youth unemployment. High rates of youth unemployment and a high proportions 
of NEETs (young people who are Not in Education, Employment or Training, known as 
"NINIs" in Spanish) suggest that countries are not taking full advantage of the demographic 
dividend)2. 
 
 
The transition that is now occurring, and which will continue until 2050 and beyond, implies 
the disappearance of that dividend, and the growth of the "dependency ratio": an increasing 
proportion of senior citizens will depend on a decreasing proportion of young people for their 
standard of living and their pension income, with accompanying financial pressure on social 
protection systems.  
 
Figure 1: Latin America and the Caribbean: Demographic Trends  
 
 
Source: CELADE 
 
 
                                                      
2 http://www.ilo.org/americas/publicaciones/WCMS_235577/lang--es/index.htm 
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2. Technological factors 
 
The academic world, social networks and the media are saturated with articles about what 
the World Economic Forum has called the 4th Industrial Revolution. And it is true that a new 
wave of technological changes is impacting nearly all areas of production: manufacturing, 
services, agriculture.  
 
For example, a report by McKinsey in 20133
 
evaluated more than 100 possible candidate 
technologies to identify 12 with the greatest potential for causing economic and social 
disruption. The following list resulted: (1) the Internet and its impact on information and 
communications; (2) automation of knowledge work; (3) the Internet of Things; (4) cloud 
technology; (5) advanced robotics; (6) self-driving vehicles; (7) biotechnology and next-
generation genomics; (8) energy storage; (9) 3D printing; (10) advanced materials; (11) 
advanced oil and gas exploration; and (12) renewable energy. All of these technologies are 
having and will have massive economic and social impacts on business models and on the 
way in which humanity works, innovates, lives, interacts and studies or becomes educated.  
 
So what are the impacts of the 4th Industrial Revolution on the world of work? Much has 
been written, and undoubtedly will continue to be written, to address this question. The 
conversation about impacts of technological revolutions breaks down into three main themes: 
First, disruption, or the dynamics of job destruction and creation that has always been part 
of technological progress, but is now accelerated. This is not one technological revolution, 
but several ones happening simultaneously, and the speed of change is, if not exponential, as 
many argue, at least dizzying. The question is whether the net balance between job creation 
and job destruction will create "technological unemployment", or if economic systems will 
be able to absorb the disruption without an increase in unemployment or underemployment.  
There are two views in this regard. The pessimistic view argues that the changes are 
exponential and that productive systems and political institutions are getting behind the speed 
of the changes and will be unable to adapt. Authors such as McAffee and Brynjolfson (2014)4
 
and Martin Ford (2015)5
 
hold this view. In a widely cited work, Frey and Osborne (2015)6
 
estimate that 47% of occupations in the United States are at risk of disappearing in the next 
10 to 15 years.  
                                                      
3 http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/disruptive-technologies 
4 https://www.amazon.com/Second-Machine-Age-Prosperity-Technologies/dp/1480577472 
5 https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Robots-Technology-Threat-Jobless/dp/1480574775 
6 http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf 
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The optimistic view emphasizes that other technological revolutions in the past have 
destroyed jobs, but they have also created new ones. According to this view, there is no 
reason to think that "this time will be different", and what we lack is sociological or 
"economic imagination" to anticipate the wonderful world of new possibilities that lies ahead. 
The truth is that this debate falls into the sphere of futurology. Neither side can provide 
evidence "in advance" to support either position, and it is easy to devise scenarios of either 
Armageddon or technological fantasy.  
 
What is certain is that we are living in an age of accelerated changes and disruptions, of 
which technological change and innovation is one of its main drivers, and this creates a 
second group of impacts, the accelerated transformation of occupations and skills 
requirements: the demand for new, advanced skills is increasing, and the obsolescence of 
existing skills is accelerating. There is a debate about the extent to which new "intelligent 
machines" replace or rather supplement humans as “intelligent assistants”. This line of 
argument and analysis has been based on the distinction between routine tasks, on the 
assumption that these can be automated easily, and non-routine tasks, which are supposed to 
be difficult or impossible to automate, or between manual and cognitive labour, based on 
similar assumptions.  
 
Nevertheless, the advance of artificial intelligence, voice recognition and other technologies 
continues to offer a surprising ability or promise to produce "machines" that are able to carry 
out non-routine tasks, learn, and make forays into grey areas in the definition of "cognitive". 
Optimists say this nonetheless will open a broad field in which intelligent machines can 
supplement and multiply human skills, while new jobs and occupations for humans are 
created. In the area of robotics, there has also been an impact in the balance between "in-
sourcing" and "out-sourcing" in global value chains, because some processes that lend 
themselves to automation are returning to developed countries ("in-sourcing"), where they 
can now develop with little labour and high productivity based on robots.  
 
The convergence of the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, robotics and 3D printing is 
creating a new production paradigm called Industry 4.0. The consequences for the future of 
production and employment are massive: increasingly there are “smart products” 
(telephones, buildings, wearables, cars) that will “talk” to the “mother ship” and have a 
permanent connection between information and control centers and the individual consumer. 
This is also allowing, in some lines the production, the manufacture of customized products 
in small batches, at the same price as mass production. Increasingly logistics is also becoming 
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“smart”: from maintenance, to client service to post-sales service. Value chains are becoming 
more connected and just in time. Intelligent factories are more and more a reality: networked 
machines that “talk” among themselves and that combine the physical world of the 
transformation of materials with the virtual world of just in time information and control; all 
of this can raise productivity and increase flexibility for production and design. The 
convergence of technologies is also producing a trend towards “distributed manufacturing”, 
a new stage in the decentralization of production with the dimished importance of economies 
of scale in some lines of activity. And this will also impact traditional hierarchies in the 
organization of production and enterprise size, creating new opportunities for Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises which can be smart, distributed in networds of distributed 
manufacturing, and competitive even if small. All of these are complex trends with multiple 
and multidimensional impacts in the world of work. But Industry 4.0 is already happening. 
  
The third group of impacts is the risk of greater inequality: highly skilled and "connected" 
workers win, while the low-skilled and "disconnected" tend to lose. A large subject in itself.  
  
3. Productive development (or under-development) of countries. 
  
In a region in which 47% of working people labour under informal conditions, in which 
poverty is still 29%, in which average productivity is half or less that of leading countries, 
with a productivity gap that is expanding instead of shrinking, and which is still highly 
dependent on raw materials’ exports, a better future of work depends on countries 
implementing policies for productive development, innovation and human talent that 
diversify production structures, accelerate the growth of productivity, and of a more 
sustained, inclusive and sustainable pattern of growth with more and better jobs. This is why 
Goal 8 of the Sustainable Development Goals is of such critical importance. Viewed through 
the lens of the three desirable characteristics of growth established by Goal 8, it is clear that 
the growth of the region's countries has been neither sustained nor sufficiently inclusive and 
sustainable. Figure 2 shows the pattern of high volatility of growth that characterizes the 
region.  
 
With regard to inclusivity, the data for informality and poverty, as well as gender gaps and 
the exclusion of indigenous peoples, among other issues, show clearly the extent to which 
the pattern of growth is far from one that creates greater equality and inclusion, instead of 
the other way around. For example, Figure 3 shows the high predominance of self-
employment (28%) and employment in microenterprises (another 28%), in structure by 
enterprise size in the region. Much of the region's informality and poverty are concentrated 
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in that 56% of self-employment and microenterprise employment.  
 
Figure 2: Volatility of growth, 1961-2013. 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled based on ECLAC data  
 
 
This type of structure, with few medium and large enterprises, constitutes a brake on 
productivity growth. As argued in the ILO report, "Small Enterprises, Large Gaps", it would 
be important to have more formal employment in medium and large enterprises to close the 
decent work gaps7.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
7 http://www.ilo.org/americas/publicaciones/WCMS_423684/lang--en/index.htm 
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Figure 3: Structure of Employment by Enterprise Size  
 
 
Source: ILO (2015) Small Enterprises, Large Gaps, Lima, Peru  
 
It is true that the middle classes have grown in some countries, but the recurring cycles of 
deceleration or the "new normal" of mediocre growth disappoint expectations of constant 
improvement and upward mobility for the middle classes, complicating governance and 
politics, undermining trust in government and politicians and increasing conflict. 
  
It is important to understand that extreme inequality, that can undermine social cohesion and 
contribute to a sense that "all citizens are not in the same boat", is not just a matter of social 
policy and progressive taxation but of productive under-development, because inequalities 
are rooted in what ECLAC for decades has called "structural heterogeneity"—that very 
heterogeneous profile of growth and productivity that combines a few sectors, activities and 
territorial areas of high productivity and high wages with a great majority of sectors, activities 
and territorial areas of low productivity and low wages. Governments and societies have been 
slow to understand that combating inequality is not just a matter of social policies, but 
requires policies for productive development. 
  
Fortunately, understanding of this point is improving, and there is now a return, although still 
weak, to focusing attention on policies for increasing productivity, accelerating productive 
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transformation, and investing in innovation and the development of human talent8. 
 
4. New enterprise models and forms of contracting. 
  
New technologies are making major innovations in business models possible. There has been 
an explosion in what is known by many names, including the "gig economy", "on-demand 
economy" and "sharing economy” 9.
 
In Jazz argot, a "gig" is a "musical commitment" in 
which musicians are hired for one-time performances, and this is not an entirely inaccurate 
description of what some "on-line platforms" or "apps" do, as they are places where 
temporary positions are common and organizations hire independent workers to provide 
services.  
 
What can be foreseen—indeed, it is already having a strong impact—is a radical change in 
the classical employment relationships (long-term relationships with an enterprise, regulated 
by a clear contract that specifies employment conditions and provides well-defined labour 
rights, including access to social security—health insurance and pensions) toward a variety 
of new forms of employment, such as independent work or self-employment; temporary 
work and part- time work; work for hire or on demand; and a variety of forms of 
"outsourcing". For example, several studies predict that by 2020, between 30% and 40% of 
North American workers will be independent contractors. 
  
These new developments pose the fundamental question of how to regulate these new 
situations, and how to ensure that in this new world of work, all workers have the basic 
protections granted by classical labour rights. 
  
One example illustrates the dilemmas. Omar, an Uber cab driver in Los Angeles, was 
attacked by a passenger and had to go to hospital. Omar asked Uber to pay his medical and 
hospital bills. But in the new collaborative economy, workers lack the classical protections 
associated with standard labour relations (work hours, unemployment insurance, minimum 
wage, health insurance, pension). Situations such as this one have sparked an intense legal 
debate and numerous lawsuits, which revolve around the issue of whether workers in the new 
                                                      
8 See SALAZAR-XIRINACHS, J.M, NÜBLER I. and KOZUL-WRIGHT (2014) Transforming Economies: Making 
Industrial Policy Work for Growth, Jobs and Development. In: 
http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_242878/lang-- en/index.htm 
9 https://www.amazon.com/Sharing-Economy-Employment-Crowd-Based- 
Capitalism/dp/0262034573/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1474724532&sr=8-
1&keywords=the+sharing+economy 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collaborative platforms have been erroneously classified as "independent contractors”10. In 
this debate, two options are normally discussed: (a) establish a new category of "independent 
workers" and protect them with special legislation; or (b) recognize that they are de facto 
employees and protect them under existing legislation. Given the wide variety of situations, 
this is a multifaceted debate that has only just begun.  
 
The risks and conditions of the collaborative economy (low income, lack of social security, 
health insurance and pensions) apply not only to workers in this new economy, but also to 
temporary, contract and part-time workers, and of course to the millions of informal workers 
in Latin America (in retail sales and construction)11. The challenge, therefore, is not only to 
regulate the "new collaborative economy," but to ensure that all workers have basic 
protections.  
 
This includes challenges, such as: how to expand coverage and make it easier for all workers 
to contribute to social security and to be insured against disability and illness? How to ensure 
that health and pension benefits belong to the worker and are not linked with the employer? 
What financial and legal mechanisms can be established so those benefits follow the worker 
throughout his or her working life, regardless of employment status (portability of benefits)? 
How to achieve representation, freedom to organize and freedom to bargain collectively for 
workers in the "collaborative economy"? How those workers can advance their interests?. A 
variety of initiatives are already emerging in the United States and Europe. To organize the 
"voice" and participation of non-organized workers in the new collaborative economy, the 
rallying cry of 21st-century "crowd-based capitalism" appears to be "Independent workers of 
the world, unite!"  
 
5. Political mindsets of social actors and social dialogue processes. 
  
The rate of penetration of technologies and their impacts; the possibility of accelerated, 
sustained and inclusive processes of learning, productive development and structural 
transformation; and regulatory frameworks to cover the new business models and forms of 
contracting are not "forces of nature" that no one can influence. They are social and political 
institutions in a broad sense, which provide incentives and opportunities for both economic 
and social innovations. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, these institutions can be 
                                                      
10 http://civicskunkworks.com/watch-elizabeth-warren-explain-why-america-needs-to-have-a-conversation-
about- the-future-of-work/  
11 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/--- 
travail/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_338262.pdf  
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inclusive, benefiting the large majority, or exclusive and extractive, benefiting a relatively 
small elite. Whether a country's institutional situation goes one way or the other is strongly 
influenced by the political views and mindsets of the main social actors and by the existence 
and quality social dialogue processes and institutions, including public-private partnerships 
and forms of collaboration to discuss and work together towards development goals. These 
are the institutions and processes that integrate and define a society's governance 
mechanisms.  
 
In other words, the future of work must not be viewed deterministically, as the result of 
technological or other forces over which societies have no control. That future will depend 
largely on the ability of societies to offer adequate collective responses to impacts that can 
be anticipated and to guide and accelerate processes of change in positive directions.  
 
II. Skills and the agenda for enhancing human talent  
 
Human capital and skills are vectors that connect several of the most important challenges 
that the region faces, mentioned above related to the future of work and employment: the 
slow growth of productivity; low rates of innovation; inequality; social exclusion; and the 
capabilities to take advantage of technological revolutions. The agenda for investment and 
for enhancing human talent is therefore strategic and is at the core of productive development 
and job quality.  
 
This agenda for enhancing skills and human talent for productive development and the 
growth of productivity in the region's countries should address at least five action areas12:
 
 
 
First, aligning education systems with productive development policies (PDPs). High- 
performance Asian countries, including Korea, not only have had a vision of long-range 
productive transformation, but they have also aligned their education and training systems 
with that vision, including sectoral strategies for skills development, with close cooperation 
between industry and institutions for vocational training. In Latin America, several factors 
have impeded such alignment; perhaps the most important one has been timidity about having 
clear strategies for productive transformation and innovation, and reluctance in the past 20 
years to adopt industrial policies. It is no surprise, therefore, that the region's countries show 
low indicators in the area of innovation and productivity. Shortcomings in skills and 
innovation reinforce one another, because the lack of skilled workers has a negative effect 
                                                      
12 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/6-ways-latin-america-can-close-its-skills-gap/  
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on innovation, while low levels of innovation inhibit demand for highly skilled workers, 
contributing to the vicious circle of low productivity. Low productivity is also explained by 
the predominance of microenterprises and small-scale enterprises, which have human 
resources with lower educational levels than medium and large enterprises. 
  
It is no surprise, then, that a cultural preference for studies in non-scientific fields 
predominates. If there is no clear national vision of productive development, in which public 
policy is committed to the growth of certain sectors, or high-technology clusters, or 
renewable energy, or services such as tourism, or specific agricultural activities, in 
partnership with the respective industries, there will be no positive signals; rather, there will 
be few incentives for young people and their families to choose to study fields such as 
specialized engineering or other "hard sciences". This is exacerbated by the fact that many 
universities in the region traditionally have emphasized the social sciences and the 
humanities and have been indifferent to, or have openly resisted, a "productivist" or 
technological approach to the choice of careers and fields of study. Skills-development 
policies achieve more satisfactory outcomes when there is a clear vision and there are solid 
policies for productive transformation and innovation, including policies for sectoral skills 
with the active participation of the private sector. 
  
Second, improving the coverage, quality and relevance of education and vocational training. 
Latin America and the Caribbean have made notable progress in coverage and enrolment 
rates. Nevertheless, enrolment in early childhood education remains low at 66%, compared 
to 83% in the OECD. Enrolment is also low in secondary school (74%, compared to 91% for 
the OECD) and tertiary education (42%, compared to 71% for the OECD). These are major 
gaps that must be closed. The gap in secondary education is of particular concern, as recent 
studies show that countries in which the educational achievement structure lacks a middle 
level (low proportion of secondary education) have far fewer skills and less flexibility for 
achieving productive transformation and diversification. The most serious problems are in 
the areas of quality and relevance. The eight Latin American countries that participated in 
the OECD's PISA tests fell into the lower third of the ranking of 65 countries in the three 
areas tested (mathematics, sciences and reading).  
 
A third action area is to modernize vocational training models. Various assessments indicate 
serious shortcomings and gaps in vocational training systems in the region. The Inter-
American Development Bank is the most critical, and maintains that these systems "tend to 
be outdated, discredited and disconnected from the needs of the private sector", that "their 
operations are ineffective, their coverage rates fall short, and levels of quality and relevance 
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are low". It also states that these deficiencies are a key factor that explains the shortage of 
skills that characterizes the region. Other assessments by institutions such as the Andean 
Development Corporation, World Bank, ILO and ECLAC are perhaps less drastic in their 
conclusions, but they point to similar institutional problems and empirical shortcomings.  
 
Some figures speak for themselves. On average, public expenditure on training amounts to 
barely 0.4% of regional GDP. Only a small percentage of workers receive some type of 
training: 15% in Chile, 24% in Colombia, 10% in the Dominican Republic, 5.5% in 
Honduras, 4.3% in Panama and 24% in Uruguay. According to World Bank business surveys, 
only 3% of enterprises offer training to their workers. Changing this situation is one of the 
key challenges for productive development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and it 
requires significant reforms in models and systems for vocational training, including greater 
attention to so-called soft or socio- emotional skills. 
 
Fourth, there is a need for closer public-private cooperation and more proactive action by the 
private sector. Quality problems and the skills gap are linked to the major disconnect between 
the world of education and the world of work. Addressing these disconnects is a public policy 
issue, though not exclusively. It is also largely a matter of private-sector participation and 
responsibility. Traditionally, the business sector has depended on governments to educate 
and train their future employees. These traditional separations, however, no longer work well 
and should change: partly because in the new era of exponential technological changes 
traditional education and training systems are no longer able to offer the skilled graduates 
that enterprises need, but also because it is not very realistic for companies to think that future 
workers are completely prepared to take their positions without prior training through 
apprenticeships in the enterprise. 
  
Enterprise participation in education and vocational training can take many forms: 
apprenticeships, internships and other on-the-job experience programs, observation of the 
work, career presentations and professional networking, workplace visits, business mentors, 
contests organized by enterprises, and enrichment of study plans. The dual education 
approach and apprenticeship programs are especially effective forms of training which 
should be given much higher priority in Latin America and the Caribbean than it has received 
so far. 
  
Finally, it is important to redouble efforts to promote entrepreneurship as a skill. There is 
evidence of cultural barriers in Latin America and the Caribbean that are detrimental to the 
entrepreneurial spirit. Most MBA students in Latin America say their plan is not to start a 
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business, but to get a job in a large, multinational company. Meanwhile, most public policies 
have focused on supporting established micro- and small enterprises rather than start-ups. It 
is important to provide ecosystems for entrepreneurship with an integrated vision: from 
enterprise- development services to business incubators, from legal frameworks that foster 
an entrepreneurial spirit to orientation and financial services. Entrepreneurial talent is one of 
the most valuable skills and a relatively scarce resource, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean can ill afford to waste it.  
    
III. Conclusion  
 
In short, the future of work in the region will be brighter insofar as there are clear policies 
for productive development and human talent, to transform a growth model that is still highly 
dependent on raw materials, through a common vision forged in solid social dialogue 
processes. Policies for productive development and human talent must also go hand in hand 
with labour market policies, and vice versa. Either without the other is weak.  
 
New pacts are needed that reflect this renewed and more integrated view of the nexus of 
productive development, technology, innovation, education, skills, employment and 
employability, and institutional reforms, and which translate them into concrete action. This 
implies strengthening venues for policy dialogue, as well as reviewing rationales and 
institutions for collective action.  
 
